At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

This article challenges the scholarly consensus on Willem Jacob 's Gravesande’s philosophy, namely the view that it was predominantly influenced by Newton, Locke, and Descartes. More generally, it opposes the tendency to read the work of eighteenth-century natural philosophers as being part of well-defined strands of Newtonianism. I argue that we will understand the intellectual history of the early eighteenth century better if we let go of essentialist taxonomic views and instead pay attention to the historical trajectories of (...) various actors and ideas. In the case of 's Gravesande (1688–1742), it has often been assumed that he used a particular form of Newtonianism to combat rationalist metaphysics, particularly Spinozism. Here I show that this view is not tenable when we take account of 's Gravesande’s metaphysical writings. On topics such as liberty, necessity, and theodicy, these writings deviate from what Newtonianism is usually taken to stand for. Instead, 's Gravesande’s views on such matters correspond more closely to certain interpretations of Leibniz’s Théodicée. (shrink)

In 1720, Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande wrote Physicis elementa mathematica, experimentis confirmata. Sive introductio ad philosophiam Newtonianam. Although he was undoubtedly one of the most important popularizers of Newtonian physics, experimental methodology and epistemology in the 1720s, his empirical claim somehow backfired: in applying tenets of Newtonian methodology, he was ultimately led to validate the Leibnizian principle of the conservation of living forces, contrary to the Newtonians. This conclusion invited a great deal of anger, particularly from Samuel Clarke (...) who, in a volume of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society from 1729, accused ’s Gravesande of having written the book with the aim of “darkening Newton’s philosophy”. In a reply, which ’s Gravesande published as a supplement to his Essay upon a New Theory of the Collision of Bodies, he developed a hybrid methodology that relied upon both experimentation and reason. In my paper, I shall thoroughly analyse this interesting combination. (shrink)

Through a close reading of the opening pages of Occidental Eschatology, this paper analyzes how Jacob Taubes relied on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy to understand the nature of eschatology. Taubes implemented Heidegger’s notions of truth, error, and history from his seminal essay “On the Essence of Truth,” (mis)interpreting the essay by ascribing an eschatological meaning to it. This surprisingly allowed him to find in Heidegger a model to come to terms with the Jewish experience of history. In order to fully (...) understand this untimely use of Heidegger’s work, the paper turns its attention to the correspondence of Jacob Taubes with his first wife, Susan Taubes. The conclusion asks to what extent Jacob Taubes’s uncritical use of Heidegger’s thinking plays into the latter’s notorious antisemitism. (shrink)

Throughout the twentieth century, German writers, philosophers, theologians, and historians turned to Gnosticism to make sense of the modern condition. While some saw this ancient Christian heresy as a way to rethink modernity, most German intellectuals questioned Gnosticism's return in a contemporary setting. In No Spiritual Investment in the World, Willem Styfhals explores the Gnostic worldview's enigmatic place in these discourses on modernity, presenting a comprehensive intellectual history of Gnosticism's role in postwar German thought. Establishing the German-Jewish philosopher (...) class='Hi'>Jacob Taubes at the nexus of the debate, Styfhals traces how such figures as Hans Blumenberg, Hans Jonas, Eric Voegelin, Odo Marquard, and Gershom Scholem contended with Gnosticism and its tenets on evil and divine absence as metaphorical detours to address issues of cultural crisis, nihilism, and the legitimacy of the modern world. These concerns, he argues, centered on the difficulty of spiritual engagement in a world from which the divine has withdrawn. Reading Gnosticism against the backdrop of postwar German debates about secularization, political theology, and post-secularism, No Spiritual Investment in the World sheds new light on the historical contours of postwar German philosophy. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 5 - 33 The ironic but very readable dialogues on folk religion in Erasmus’ Colloquia were used as school books for two centuries. Though their influence on the battle against superstition is difficult to measure, they obviously reflect the practices and debates of their own time. This article confronts Erasmus’ dialogue on exorcism with the ideas and practices of folk religion in the sixteenth-century biconfessional duchy of Cleves under Duke William V. Two sources (...) stand out in particular: the influential treatise De praestigiis daemonum of court physician Johan Wier, an admirer of Erasmus and opponent of magic and sorcery, and the vernacular treatise on magical agency by Jacob Vallick, Catholic parish priest of the village of Groessen, which was printed by Nicolaas Biestkens in 1559. Vallick’s practical and pastoral approach to these matters, though it greatly irritated Wier, nevertheless reflects the influence of Erasmianism in Cleves even among the lower clergy. (shrink)

Throughout the twentieth century, German writers, philosophers, theologians, and historians turned to Gnosticism to make sense of the modern condition. While some saw this ancient Christian heresy as a way to rethink modernity, most German intellectuals questioned Gnosticism's return in a contemporary setting. In No Spiritual Investment in the World, Willem Styfhals explores the Gnostic worldview's enigmatic place in these discourses on modernity, presenting a comprehensive intellectual history of Gnosticism's role in postwar German thought. Establishing the German-Jewish philosopher (...) class='Hi'>Jacob Taubes at the nexus of the debate, Styfhals traces how such figures as Hans Blumenberg, Hans Jonas, Eric Voegelin, Odo Marquard, and Gershom Scholem contended with Gnosticism and its tenets on evil and divine absence as metaphorical detours to address issues of cultural crisis, nihilism, and the legitimacy of the modern world. These concerns, he argues, centered on the difficulty of spiritual engagement in a world from which the divine has withdrawn. Reading Gnosticism against the backdrop of postwar German debates about secularization, political theology, and post-secularism, No Spiritual Investment in the World sheds new light on the historical contours of postwar German philosophy. (shrink)

While the concept of secularization is traditionally used to define the nature of modern culture, and sometimes to uncover the theological origins of secular modernity, its validity is being questioned ever more radically today. Genealogies of the Secular returns to the historical, intellectual, and philosophical roots of this concept in the twentieth-century German debates on religion and modernity, and presents a wide range of strategies that German thinkers have applied to apprehend the connection between religion and secularism. In fundamentally heterogeneous (...) ways, these strategies all developed "genealogies of the secular" by tracing modern phenomena back to their religious or theological roots. This book aims to disclose the complex prehistory of the contemporary debates on political theology and postsecularism, and to show how prominent thinkers continue this German tradition today. It explores and assesses the classic theories of secularization that are epitomized in Carl Schmitt's writings on political theology, but also addresses German philosophers whose work has been rarely associated with secularization, including Walter Benjamin, Ernst Cassirer, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant, and Hannah Arendt. Attention is also paid to two thinkers whose role in these discourses has not been fully explored yet: Jacob Taubes and Jan Assmann. By introducing their thinking on religion, politics, and secularization, the book also makes two of their own key texts available to an English-language readership. (shrink)

SummaryIn 1714, the Dutch scholar Willem Jacob's Gravesande published a theoretical essay on how to optimize the air-pump. Although his paper did not attract much attention, there was one important supplier of air-pumps who knew about it: the Leiden instrument maker Jan van Musschenbroek. 's Gravesande and he cooperated intensively between 1717 and 1742. Among other things, this cooperation resulted in two new air-pump designs to replace Musschenbroek's own models. A closer analysis of's Gravesande's influence on Musschenbroek's repertoire (...) reveals that the various changes were not inspired by the theory of the air-pump. Commercial and practical considerations were much more important than theoretical reflections, even though both approaches aimed at the same goal: a fast and handy air-pump. (shrink)

Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande is widely remembered as a leading advocate of Isaac Newton’s work. In the first half of the eighteenth century, ’s Gravesande was arguably Europe’s most important proponent of what would become known as Newtonian physics. ’s Gravesande himself minimally described this discipline, which he called «physica», as studying empirical regularities mathematically while avoiding hypotheses. Commentators have as yet not progressed much beyond this view of ’s Gravesande’s physics. Therefore, much of its precise nature, its (...) methodology, and its relation to Newton’s actual work remains unclear. This article discusses one particular methodological element that ’s Gravesande himself often stressed in detail, namely the use of mathematics in philosophy and physics. In doing so, it takes exception to the claim that mathematics played only a minor role in ’s Gravesande’s work, a view put forward in recent historiography. Besides that, this article casts new light on the interpretation of ’s Gravesande’s philosophical notion of «mathematical reasoning», a notion that has remained somewhat obscure thus far. (shrink)

The present study defines the function of the foundation of science in early modern Dutch philosophy, from the first introduction of Cartesian philosophy in Utrecht University by Henricus Regius to the acceptance of Newtonian physics by Willem Jacob ‘s Gravesande. My main claim is that a foundation of science was required because the conceptual premises of new ways in thinking had to be justified not only as alternatives to the established philosophical paradigms or as an answer to the (...) “sceptical crisis” signalled by Richard Popkin, but also in order to be introduced in the academia. This being my general thesis, different kinds of foundation of scientific knowledge are analysed in the light of the specific problems philosophers had to face. To this end, foundational theories are analysed in the light of 1) the overall aim of their philosophy, 2) the relations of disciplines they thought out, 3) what they regarded as scientific knowledge. Through this analysis, I assess that the foundation of science was carried out by metaphysical, logical and theological arguments, which fitted the needs of answering the didactical and introductory requirements of new paradigms, assessed the reliability of new methodology in leading us to grasp the truth, and provided philosophy with its conceptual apparatus. Finally, I demonstrate that a philosophy of science as a reflection on the principles, methods, concepts and application of modern science emerged in the Dutch Republic. (shrink)

This monograph explains how, in the aftermath of the battle over René Descartes' philosophy, Newton's natural philosophy found fertile ground at the University of Leiden. Newton's natural philosophical views and methods, along with their underlying distinctions, seamlessly aligned with the University of Leiden's institutional-religious policy, which urged professors and students to separate theology from philosophy. Additionally, these views supported the natural philosophical agendas of Herman Boerhaave, Willem Jacob's Gravesande, and Petrus van Musschenbroek. Newton's natural philosophical program was especially (...) useful in the three Leiden professors' project of reforming existing disciplines and providing them with epistemic legitimacy. (shrink)

It has been suggested in the literature that, although Willem Jacob ‘s Gravesande occasionally treated Newton's doctrines in a selective manner, he was nevertheless an unremitting follower of Newton's methodology. As part of a reassessment of ‘s Gravesande's Newtonianism, I argue that, although ‘s Gravesande took over key terms of Newton's methodological canon, his methodological ideas are upon close scrutiny quite different from and occasionally even incongruent with Newton's views on the matter.

In this essay I reassess Willem Jacob ‘s Gravesande's Newtonianism. I draw attention to ‘s Gravesande's a-causal rendering of physics which went against Newton's causal understanding of natural philosophy and to his attempt to establish a solid foundation for the certainty of Newton's natural philosophy, which he considered as a powerful antidote against the theological aberrations of Descartes and especially Spinoza. I argue that, although ‘s Gravesande clearly took inspiration from Newton's natural philosophy, he was running his own (...) scientific and intellectual agenda and that he was combining Newtonian and non-Newtonian elements. (shrink)

Diese Studien untersuchen den Natur- und Wissenschaftsbegriff sowie die naturwissenschaftliche Methode Albrecht von Hallers (1708-1777) in ihrer Entstehung im Rahmen des naturrechtlichen Denkens der Frühaufklärung. Von Relevanz ist dabei Hallers Beziehung zum Newtonianismus Willem Jacob 'sGravesandes, der Newtons mathematische Naturwissenschaft experimentalistisch umdeutet und die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnislehre auf der >moralischenneospinozistische.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science by Andrea StrazzoniAaron SpinkAndrea Strazzoni. Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019. Pp. ix + 245. Hardback, $124.99.Andrea Strazzoni's Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science is a clear step forward in our understanding of the rise and fall of Cartesianism. The work, limited to the Dutch context with one (...) notable German excursion, covers roughly one hundred years starting from the 1630s. While the time frame is rather large in scope, the majority of the work is narrower in focus, with a heavy emphasis on the academic circles in mid-to-late seventeenth-century Leiden and Utrecht. It is thus a welcome addition to the growing body of literature dealing with the unique political, religious, and academic contexts in which Dutch Cartesians found themselves. While much of the book deals with the philosophy of Descartes and then Newton, Strazzoni is not concerned with giving any novel interpretations of either figure; instead, he sheds a great deal of light on a cast of characters who are only now coming to be appreciated for their contributions and influence on philosophical movements of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The book has two main explicit goals. First, Strazzoni wants to show why foundationalism came to play such a prominent role in Dutch Cartesian circles and what foundationalism's effects were. Second, through this examination, Strazzoni hopes to show that the multiplication of worldviews [End Page 154] shaped a new function for metaphysics and logic as tools for examining principles, which in turn determined a change in the function of philosophy itself that eventually gave birth to a kind of philosophy of science familiar to us today.Strazzoni divides this project into eight chapters, with a focus on six figures: Henricus Regius, Johannes Clauberg, Johannes de Raey, Arnold Geulincx, Burchard de Volder, and Willem Jacob's Gravesande. In addition to a brief overview of the goals and structure of the work, the first chapter includes a survey of how methodologies have changed in the history of philosophy and the history of the philosophy of science, which will be helpful background for those less familiar with the fields.The following two chapters deal with the crises that emerged in Utrecht and Leiden over the spread of Cartesian philosophy. In chapter 2, building on Theo Verbeek's work, Regius takes center stage. While some context of the Utrecht crisis is given, Strazzoni spends much of the chapter detailing how Regius's medical background led to a more empirical approach and lack of metaphysical foundation. While Regius's own controversial positions embroiled both himself and Descartes in the Utrecht Crisis, ripple effects spread to Leiden, resulting in prohibitions against discussions of Cartesian philosophy. In the third chapter, Strazzoni highlights a group of anti-Cartesians, with Jacob Revius as the primary antagonist, and the responses from De Raey and Clauberg. Clauberg, the subject of Strazzoni's only sustained discussion of Cartesianism from Germany, coordinated with de Raey on both a positive campaign of promotion and strategizing responses to the anti-Cartesian front. Outside of discussing Clauberg's explicit role in Leiden, Strazzoni studies his logic and Ontosophia, neatly explaining his shift to more metaphysical foundations.Chapters 4, 5, and 6 continue exploring the various approaches and roles for foundational philosophy in more detail, delving into how these controversies motivated renewed analysis of core Cartesian principles with integration into an academic curriculum in mind. Apart from de Raey's efforts to show that Cartesianism was aligned with Aristotelianism, Strazzoni claims a period of Cartesian physics without an explicit preoccupation with metaphysical questions, especially in light of the restrictions imposed by the curators of Leiden's university. However, as Spinoza and Hobbes came to prominence, multiplying the number of philosophical worldviews, foundational arguments were needed to combat them. Strazzoni highlights how varied these responses could be, as Geulincx's own take on foundations leaned heavily toward ethics rather than epistemology, metaphysics, or logic. However, the discussion of Geulincx is much broader, also including illuminating expositions of Geulincx's theology, epistemology, and metaphysics.Chapter 5 expounds further... (shrink)

When was philosophy of science born? And why? This book aims to answer these questions. Simply put, philosophy of science was born in seventeenth-century Dutch universities, where the introduction of Cartesian ideas called for philosophical reflection upon the validity, method, and concepts of natural philosophy. The disciplines which fulfilled this role were metaphysics and logic. The process was neither short nor straightforward, nor – admittedly – easily grasped through such a generalisation. As a matter of fact, philosophy of science has (...) existed since antiquity, or for as long as philosophers have provided reflections on such topics. On the other hand, the institutional fragmentation of philosophical and scientific disciplines in the modern era has made it increasingly easy to distinguish between ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’, and for philosophers to provide reflections on the natural sciences. This book stands at the crossroads: namely, it disentangles the ways in which metaphysics and logic became functional for such reflection, and, forthwith, they began to be detached from what was labelled ‘natural philosophy’. This is the reason why this book offers a study of Dutch Cartesianism. Dutch universities were the first where Descartes’s ideas became official matter of teaching and came to reshape the function of metaphysics and logic. So that one can meaningfully ascribe the role of ‘philosophy of science’ to them, and to see this role at work in lectures, disputations, treatises. Again, this is a simplification. Philosophy of science did not appear abruptly, nor was it related only to a transformation of metaphysics, logic, and natural philosophy: its emergence coincided with a rethinking of the foundations of all philosophical disciplines. Philosophy of science appeared, first, as a reflection on philosophy itself, carried out in different disciplines. More precisely, it emerged as a renewed foundation of all philosophical disciplines, serving to guarantee the reliability of their methodologies and concepts, namely, to grant their status as indubitable scientiae. (shrink)

Since the 1960s the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science has been substantiated by the presence of university departments offering a curriculum of studies catering to both disciplines. At Princeton University, Charles Gillespie established the first curriculum of studies in the history and philosophy of science – henceforth HPS – in 1960, with the purpose of attracting students to the study of the history of science. In Princeton, history of science was taught by John E. (...) Murdoch, while Hilary Putnam gave courses in philosophy of science. At Indiana University it was a historian of philosophy, Norwood Russell Hanson, who established the first department of HPS, hosting the teaching of historian of science Alfred Rupert Hall. Eventually, the actual integration of history and philosophy of science was brought about by the appearance of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which, drawing attention to the notion of paradigm in scientific theories, favoured the marriage between historical and philosophical analysis of science. Since 1960s, HPS has flourished, and nowadays at least five universities in the United Kingdom and sixteen in the United States offer degrees in HPS (Mauskopf/Schmaltz 2012, pp. 1–10). More recently, kindred approaches have emerged, such as the ‘integrated HPS’ (&HPS), endorsed in some international conferences, which aims at merging the two disciplines rather than offering philosophical insights into the history of science and vice versa. (shrink)

Through a consideration of the philosophical debates occurring in the Dutch and Dutch-related intellectual framework in the early modern period, in the present study some alternatives in the foundation of philosophy and science have been highlighted and analysed. In conclusion, it is time to assess them in a more systematic manner. Each alternative entails a different view on foundational arguments, which may be grouped into theological, metaphysical, and logical ones. This research reveals the essential features of a philosophical milieu created (...) by Descartes and constituting the framework for the dissemination of Newtonian science in Europe, leading to the birth of a philosophy of science as the study of the foundations, assumptions, methods, and limits of the study of natural realms. In fact, one can recognise several reasons for such foundation: on a general level, the need of providing philosophy with a secure foundation against the ‘sceptical crisis’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries highlighted by Richard Popkin. More specifically, however, the foundation of Cartesian and Newtonian philosophy and science served to defend the conceptual premises of new ways of thinking in an academic context, demonstrating the validity of such new ways and rejecting the commonsensical and non-explanatory assumptions of Scholastic philosophy, and, in the case of ’s Gravesande, the speculative character of Descartes’s physics itself. (shrink)

The seventh chapter focuses on the aftermath of the decline of Cartesianism as a leading force in the Dutch academic context. After De Volder and De Raey, indeed, only Ruardus Andala in Franeker carried on the teaching of Cartesian physics (which he taught by commenting upon Descartes’s Principia) and metaphysics, mainly for the sake of contrasting Spinozism and other forms of radical Cartesianism. Thus, Descartes’s philosophy came a dead end on the eve of the eighteenth century. Yet, Leiden Cartesianism and (...) the Leiden experimental tradition (which could include, after De Volder and Senguerd, the activities of Herman Boerhaave), favoured the introduction of Newtonianism as the standard in teaching natural philosophy. This was carried out by ’s Gravesande, who used logic and metaphysics (including rational theology), that is, the chief foundational disciplines in the Cartesian tradition, to introduce students to and justify the assumptions (methodological and ontological) of a Newtonian approach in natural philosophy. This had two outcomes. On the one hand, his arguments in metaphysics (i.e. ontology) have the function of clarifying which objects natural philosophy can investigate. These are natural laws, whose ultimate source in substances or modes cannot be ascertained by intellect alone, as they depend on the power of God. On the other, given the fact that experience is our only means of grasping such laws (which are then mathematically handled) he provides a rational-theological justification of experiential evidence, as capable of providing us with a degree of certainty equal to mathematical evidence. As for the Cartesians, this is still the paradigm of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, with the introduction of Newtonianism foundational disciplines such as logic and metaphysics (including rational theology) served as a justification for and a reflection on a given scientific methodology. Thus, philosophy started to be actually detached from the natural sciences, and to assume a subservient role with respect to them, as once it was the ancilla theologiae. (shrink)

Wigner's quantum-mechanical classification of particle-types in terms of irreducible representations of the Poincaré group has a classical analogue, which we extend in this paper. We study the compactness properties of the resulting phase spaces at fixed energy, and show that in order for a classical massless particle to be physically sensible, its phase space must feature a classical-particle counterpart of electromagnetic gauge invariance. By examining the connection between massless and massive particles in the massless limit, we also derive a classical-particle (...) version of the Higgs mechanism. (shrink)

While sports governing bodies are, in many countries, increasingly concerned with defining, delineating and defending commercial rights derived from the effective control of sports...

Substituted judgment has increasingly become the accepted standard for rendering decisions for incapacitated adults in the USA. A broad exception exists with regard to patients with diminished capacity secondary to depressive disorders, as such patients’ previous wishes are generally not honoured when seeking to turn down life-preserving care or pursue aid-in-dying. The result is that physicians often force involuntary treatment on patients with poor medical prognoses and/or low quality of life as a result of their depressive symptoms when similarly situated (...) incapacitated patients without such depressive symptoms would have their previous wishes honoured via substituted judgment. This commentary argues for reconsidering this approach and for using a substituted judgment standard for a subset of EMP/LQL patients seeking death. (shrink)

This article summarizes some of the results of the BIOMED II project “Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw” connected to a research project of the Danish Research Councils “Bioethics and Law”. The BIOMED project was based on cooperation between 22 partners in most EU countries. The aim of the project was to identify the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as four important ideas or values for a European bioethics and biolaw. The research concluded (...) that the basic ethical principles cannot be understood as universal everlasting ideas or transcendental truths but they rather function reflective guidelines and important values in European culture. The method of the research was conceptual, philosophical analysis of the cultural background of the four values or normative ideas that people use and find important in their existence. Moreover, this was combined with analysis of empirical legal material and policy documents. Also, a number of qualitative interviews with relevant experts were carried out. Another important result of the BIOMED project was the partner's Policy Proposals to the European Commission, the Barcelona Declaration, unique as a philosophical and political agreement between experts in bioethics and biolaw from many different countries. The Policy Proposals are reprinted here at the end of the article. (shrink)

What theory should we accept from the practical point of view, or accept as a basis for guiding our actions, if we don’t know which theory is true, and if there are too many plausible alternative theories for us to take them all into consideration? This question is the theme of the first three parts of this dissertation. I argue that the problem of theory acceptance, so understood, is a problem of practical rationality, and hence that the appropriate grounds for (...) theory acceptance are practical considerations. I argue for a number of principles of theory acceptance, and I explore the implications of these principles for the acceptance both of descriptive theories and evaluative theories. (shrink)

Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...) two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action. (shrink)

As conceptual and theoretical discussions on environmental valuation approaches have advanced there is growing interest in the impact that valuation has on decision making. The perceived legitimacy of the outputs of valuation studies is seen as one factor influencing their impact on policy decisions. One element of this is ensuring that participants of valuation processes see the results as legitimate and would be willing to accept decisions based on these findings. Here, we test the perceived legitimacy to participants of two (...) approaches to deliberative monetary valuation, deliberated preferences and Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation, in the context of marine planning in the Clyde estuary in Scotland. We compare and contrast deliberated preference and deliberative democratic monetary valuation and track their emergence as responses to critiques of conventional stated preference approaches. We then present the results of our case study where we found that deliberative democratic monetary valuation produced valuations that were perceived as more legitimate that deliberated preference as the basis for decision making by those involved in the valuation process. (shrink)

According to the Maximin principle of distributive justice, one outcome is more just than another if the worst off individual in the first outcome is better off than the worst off individual in the second. This is often interpreted as a highly egalitarian principle, and, more specifically, as a highly egalitarian way of balancing a concern with equality against a concern with efficiency. But this interpretation faces a challenge: why should a concern with efficiency and equality lead us to a (...) concern only for the very worst off? Egalitarian proponents of Maximin tend to meet this challenge by showing that it possible to formally derive Maximin from surprisingly weak conditions relating efficiency and equality to justice. But in this paper, I argue that this reply fails. The issue is not that the proofs are invalid, but instead that every existing proof of Maximin transforms into an impossibility result as soon as we realize that any reasonable conception of equality must satisfy a certain formal property. The upshot is that even if it is possible to defend Maximin on other grounds, there is no known way to defend it on the grounds that it balances a concern with equality against a concern for efficiency. Further, more general implications of this result for egalitarian theories of distributive justice are also explored. (shrink)